Abstract. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set P of n players to evaluate a function f in presence of an adversary who corrupts a subset of the players. In this paper we consider active, general adversaries, characterized by a so-called adversary structure Z which enumerates all possible subsets of corrupted players. In particular for small sets of players general adversaries better capture real-world requirements than classical threshold adversaries. Protocols for general adversaries are "efficient" in the sense that they require |Z| O(1) bits of communication. However, as |Z| is usually very large (even exponential in n), the exact exponent is very relevant. In the setting with perfect security, the most efficient protocol known to date communicates O(|Z| 3 ) bits;
Introduction
Secure Multi-Party Computation Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows a set P of n players to securely evaluate a function f even when a subset of the players is corrupted by a central adversary. MPC was introduced by Yao [Yao82] . A first solution (with computational security) was given by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW87] . Later solutions [BGW88, CCD88, RB89] provide statistical and even perfect security. All these protocols consider threshold adversaries (characterized by an upper bound t on the number of corrupted parties). This was generalized in [HM00] by considering so-called general adversaries, characterized by an adversary structure Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z }, which enumerates all possible subsets of corrupted players. In the setting with perfect active security, MPC is achievable if and only if t < n 3 , respectively Q 3 (P, Z) (the union of no three sets in Z covers P). In the setting with statistical or cryptographic active security, MPC is achievable if and only if t < n 2 , respectively Q 2 (P, Z) (the union of no two sets in Z covers P).
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Preliminaries
Players and Computation Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be a set of n players. The players in P want to compute a function f over some finite field F. The function is specified by a circuit C consisting of input, output, random, addition, and multiplication gates.
In an ideal world, a trusted party does all the computation. In the real world, players are connected by a complete network of secure (private and authentic) synchronous channels. There exist authenticated broadcast channels (they can be simulated by the players, see e.g. [FM98] or [PW96] ). In order to compute the function f , the players simulate the trusted party by using some MPC-protocol Π.
Adversary and Adversary Structure Dishonesty is modeled in terms of a central adversary A who corrupts players. During the execution of the protocol the adversary can access the internal state of corrupted players and make them deviate from the protocol at will. We allow that the adversary is computationally unbounded. Before the execution of the protocol the adversary has to specify the players he wants to corrupt. His choice is limited by means of an adversary structure Z = {Z 1 , . . . , Z } ⊆ 2 P , i.e. all corrupted players must be part of an adversary set in Z. We denote the chosen set by Z * . Note that Z * is not known to the honest players and is solely used for ease of notation. We say that Z satisfies the Q k (P, Z) property if P ⊆ Z 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Z k ∀Z 1 , . . . , Z k ∈ Z.
Security We say a protocol is Z-secure if anything the adversary achieves during the execution of the protocol can be achieved in the ideal world as well. More precisely, for every adversary in the real world there exists an adversary in the ideal world such that both the information the adversary gets and the output of honest players are statistically indistinguishable for perfect security respectively statistically close for unconditional security. The main result from [HM97] states that Q 3 (P, Z) resp. Q 2 (P, Z) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly resp. unconditionally Z-secure protocols considering active adversaries. For simplicity we assume that all messages sent during the execution of Π are from the right domain. If a player receives a message where this is not the case, he replaces it with an arbitrary element from the right domain. If a player receives an unexpected message, he ignores it.
Perfect Protocol
In this section we present a perfectly Z-secure protocol for an arbitrary adversary structure Z satisfying the Q 3 property. The communication complexity of the protocol is quadratic in |Z|. The efficiency gain is due to an improved multiplication protocol. The sharing is (up to presentation) the same as in [Mau02] .
Secret Sharing
Secret sharing allows a player to distribute a secret value among the player set, such that only qualified subsets of players are able reconstruct it. The secret sharing used for our protocol is based on the one from [Mau02] 
It is characterized by a sharing specification S = (S 1 , . . . , S h ), which is a tuple of subsets of P. Definition 1. A value s is shared with respect to sharing specification S = (S 1 , . . . , S h ) if the following holds: a) There exist shares s 1 , . . . , s h such that s = h q=1 s q b) Each s q is known to every (honest) player in S q
We denote the sharing of a value s by [s] and use [s] q as notation for s q , the q-th share. A sharing specification S = (S 1 , . . . , S h ) is called Z-private if for every Z ∈ Z there is an S ∈ S such that Z ∩ S = ∅. A sharing specification S = (S 1 , . . . , S h ) and an adversary structure Z satisfy
does not leak information to the adversary, as all shares known by the adversary are statistically independent of s. The players can compute a sharing of any linear combination of shared values (with respect to a sharing specification S) by locally computing the linear combination of their shares. This property is called the linearity of the sharing. The following protocol Share allows a dealer P D to correctly share value s among the players in P.
Protocol Share(P, Z, S, P D , s) [Mau02] 0: The dealer P D takes s as input. P D sends s q to every player in S q .
4:
Each player in S q forwards the received value to every player in S q .
5:
Each player in S q checks that the received values are all the same and broadcasts OK, or NOK accordingly.
6:
If a player in S q broadcast NOK, the dealer broadcasts s q and the players in S q take this value (resp. some default value if the dealer does not broadcast) as share. Otherwise every player in S q takes the value he received in Step 3 as share. 7: end for 8: The players in P collectively output [s].
Lemma 1. For any adversary structure Z the protocol Share(P, Z, S, P D , s) securely computes a sharing [s ]. For honest P D it holds that s = s. The protocol communicates at most |S| (n 2 + n) log |F| bits and broadcasts at most |S| (log |F| + n) bits.
Proof. Correctness: For each s q either all the honest players in S q hold the same value after
Step 3, or one of them complains and they receive a consistent value in Step 6. Hence the protocol outputs a (consistent) sharing [s ] . If the dealer is honest he is able to ensure in Steps 3 and 6 that the honest players use the intended value for s q such that s = s . Privacy: Let the dealer be honest, as otherwise secrecy is trivially fulfilled. All a player learns beyond his designated output are values broadcast in Step 6. However this does not violate secrecy as these values are already known to the adversary (from Step 3). Complexity: For each share at most n + n 2 values are sent and at most n + log |F| bits broadcast. For each player P j ∈ R let v j,i be the value received from P i . Then P j outputs some value v j such that there exists a Z ∈ Z with v j,i = v j for all P i ∈ S q \Z.
Lemma 3. If S q and Z satisfy Q 2 (S q , Z), the protocol ReconstructShare securely reconstructs the share [s] q to the players in R, such that every (honest) player outputs [s] q . The protocol communicates at most n 2 log |F| bits.
Proof. Correctness: In
Step 1 all honest player will send the same value [s] q , which is a suitable choice for v j for an (honest) player P j ∈ R in Step 2. For the sake of contradiction suppose there exist two values v 1 = v 2 with corresponding Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ Z such that the condition of Step 2 holds for both of them. Hence (S q \Z 1 )∩(S q \Z 2 ) = ∅ and thus S q ⊆ Z 1 ∪ Z 2 which contradicts Q 2 (S q , Z). Therefore every honest players outputs the value [s] q . Privacy: The adversary learns at most [s] q (if a malicious player is part of R). Complexity: Each player in S q sends his value to at most n players.
The players in R locally sum up the obtained shares and output the sum s.
Lemma 4. If S and Z satisfy Q 2 (S, Z) and [s] is a sharing of the value s, then Reconstruct(P, Z, S, [s], R) securely reconstructs s to the players in R. The protocol communicates at most |S| n 2 log |F| bits.
Proof. Correctness and privacy follow directly from Lemma 3. As ReconstructShare is invoked |S| times the complexity follows as well.
Multiplication
We present a protocol for the perfectly-secure computation of the (shared) product of two shared values [a] and [b] (with respect to a sharing specification S). Along the lines of [Mau02] the fundamental idea of multiplication is to assign each local product a p b q to a player in S p ∩ S q , who computes and shares his designated products. The sum of all these sharings is a sharing of ab as long as no player actively cheated. So each player is mapped to a collection of local products, formalized by a function I :
We first show an optimistic multiplication protocol which takes an additional parameter Z and computes the correct product if the actual adversary set Z * is a subset of Z. In this protocol local products are assigned to players in P \ Z only. Clearly this is possible if and only if for each local product a player in P \Z holds both involved shares, i.e. ∀S p , S q ∈ S : S p ∩S q \Z = ∅. So for each Z ∈ Z let I Z be a mapping as above with the additional constraint that
The players in P take collectively [a], [b] and Z as input.
1: a) Each player P i ∈ P \ Z (locally) computes his designated products and shares the sum
The protocol communicates at most O(|S| n 3 log |F|) bits and broadcasts at most O(|S| (n log |F| + n 2 )) bits.
Proof. Correctness: The properties of the sharing protocol guarantee that the outputs are valid sharings. If none of the players in P \ Z cheated actively, it holds for each
Hence it follows that c = ab. Privacy / Complexity: Follow directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
As the players do not know the actual adversary set Z * , they invoke OptimisticMult once for each set Z ∈ Z (Step 1 of the Multiplication protocol). This guarantees that at least one of the resulting sharings is correct. By comparing them the players can determine whether cheating occurred (Step 2 of the Multiplication protocol). If all sharings are equal, no cheating occurred and any of the sharings can serve as sharing of the product. Otherwise at least one player cheated. In this case the (honest) players can identify him and remove all sharings where he was involved in computation, as these sharings are potentially tampered (Step 3 of the Multiplication protocol). This checking and removing is repeated until all remaining sharing are equal (and hence correct). As the identification of cheaters does not reveal any information to the adversary, Multiplication allows the secure computation of the product of two shared secret values.
3: If all differences are zero, output [c ( Z) ] as sharing of the product.
Step 2.
Lemma 6. If S and Z satisfy Q 2 (S, Z) the protocol Multiplication yields a sharing [c] = [ab] . No information is leaked to the adversary. Multiplication communicates at most O(|S| |Z| n 3 log |F| + |S| n 5 log |F|) bits and broadcasts at most O(|S| |Z| (n log |F| + n 2 ) + |S| (n 3 log |F| + n 4 )) bits.
Proof. Correctness: By invoking OptimisticMult for each Z ∈ Z it holds for Z * that [c
Hence the protocol terminates successfully outputting a sharing of ab. Otherwise there exists [c
In Step 3a) each player is supposed to share a partition of his shares. Hence one of the following cases must occur: There exists a player P i such that
Or there exists a pair of players
]. In the first case P i will be detected as cheater in Step 3b). In the second case the cheater will be detected in Step 3c). In both cases M ⊆ P is strictly increased, hence the protocol will terminate after at most n iterations. It holds that M ⊆ Z * and thus Z * ∈ Z M . Therefore the correct sharing [c (Z * ) ] is always used in Step 2 and the protocol will output the correct result. Privacy: By the properties of the sharing scheme and Lemma 5 the invocation of Share, Reconstruct, OptimisticMult does not violate privacy. The adversary learns the differences reconstructed in Steps 2 and 3 of Multiplication, which are all zero unless the adversary cheats. In case of cheating the reconstructed values depends solely on the inputs of the adversary and are thus already known to him, thus privacy is not violated. All values further reconstructed in Step 3c) are known to the adversary before, as either P i or P j is corrupted. Complexity: Follows from Lemmas 1, 4 and 5 by counting the number of invocations of the corresponding sub-protocols.
MPC Protocol
Combining Share, Reconstruct, and Multiplication the players can securely compute a circuit C over F, where all intermediate values are shared according to Definition 1.
The players take S . . = {P \ Z|Z ∈ Z} as sharing specification. 1: For every gate of C being evaluated do the following: -Input gate for P D : Share(P, Z, S, P D , s) is invoked to share s, where P D is the input-giving player. -Linear gate: The linear combination of the corresponding shares is computed locally using the linearity of the sharing. Theorem 1. Let P be a set of n players, C a circuit over F and Z an adversary structure satisfying Q 3 (P, Z), then MPC(P, Z, C) perfectly Z-securely evaluates C. It communicates |C| |Z| 2 · Poly(n, log |F|) bits.
Proof. It is easy to see that S . . = {P \ Z|Z ∈ Z} is a sharing specification satisfying Q 2 (S, Z). Hence by the properties of the sharing scheme and Lemma 6 the statement follows. The protocol communicates O(|C| |Z| 2 n 3 log |F| + |C| |Z| n 5 log |F|) bits and broadcasts O(|C| |Z| 2 (n log |F| + n 2 ) + |C| |Z| (n 3 log |F| + n 4 )) bits. Broadcast can be simulated with the protocol in [FM98] , which communicates Poly(n) bits in order to broadcast one bit. This yields the claimed communication complexity.
Unconditional Protocol
Our main result is an MPC protocol unconditionally Z-secure for an Q 2 adversary structure Z. Its communication complexity is linear in |Z|. This is the first protocol reaching the optimal lower bound of Ω(|Z|) on the computational complexity (see Section 6).
Information Checking
In the perfect model, Q 3 enables the honest players to securely reconstruct shares, as it assures that every share is held by enough honest players. Here, Q 2 only ensures that each share is held by at least one honest player. Correctness is achieved by the use of information checking, a technique that prevents (malicious) players from announcing wrong values (see [RB89, Bea91a, CDD + 99, HMZ08]). The following informationchecking protocol is a slight variation of [CDD + 99]. It is a three party protocol between a sender P i , a recipient P j and a verifier P k . The sender P i provides P j with some authentication tag and P k with some verification tag, such that P j later can prove the authenticity of a value s to the verifier P k . We assume that each pair P i , P k of players knows a fixed secret value α i,k ∈ F \ {0, 1}.
We say a value s is (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated if P j knows s and some authentication tag y and P k knows a verification tag z such that (s, y, z,
Lemma 7. A (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated value s does not leak information to P k .
Proof. The verification tag z is statistically independent of the value s.
Lemma 8. Let s be (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated, i.e. (s, y, z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent. Then for P j being able to find an authentication tag y for a value s = s such that (s , y , z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent is equivalent to finding α i,k .
Proof. If both (s, y, z, α i,k ) and (s , y , z, α i,k ) are 1-consistent, then also (s − s , y − y , 0, α i,k ) is 1-consistent. The corresponding polynomial of degree 1 is not parallel to the x-axis, as s − s = 0. Thus it has an unique root at α i,k = s−s s−s −y+y . Lemma 9. The players P j and P k can locally compute an authentication and a verification tag of any linear combination of (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated values (for fixed P i ). This is called the linearity of the authentication.
Proof. Let s a and s b be (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated with authentication tags y a , y b and verification tags z a , z b and the (fixed) point α i,k and let L be a linear function. Then L(s a , s b ) is (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated with authentication tag y = L(y a , y b ) and verification tag z = L(z a , z b ). This works as the polynomials of degree 1 over
Let s be a value known to P j and P k . Then these players can use the protocol Default Authenticate to (P i , P j , P k )-authenticate s without communication for arbitrary P i . Note that P i does not play an (active) role in this protocol.
Protocol DefaultAuthenticate(P i , P j , P k , s) 0: P j , P k take the value s as input. 1: P j outputs authentication tag y = s. P k outputs verification tag z = s.
Lemma 10. If the value s is known to the honest players in {P j , P k } protocol Default Authenticate(P i , P j , P k , s) securely (P i , P j , P k )-authenticates s without any communication.
Proof
The non-robust protocol Authenticate allows to securely (P i , P j , P k )-authenticate a (secret) value s.
Protocol Authenticate(P i , P j , P k , s) 0: P i and P j take the value s as input.
If NOK was broadcast the protocol is aborted. 5: P k checks if (s , y , rz + z , α i,k ) is 1-consistent. If yes P k sends OK to P j otherwise he sends (α i,k , z) to P j , who adjusts y such that (s, y, z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent. 6: P j outputs y and P k outputs z.
Lemma 11. If P k is honest and s is known to the honest players in {P i , P j }. Then Authenticate(P i , P j , P k , s) either securely (P i , P j , P k )-authenticates s or aborts except with error probability of at most 1 |F| . In the case of an abort a player in {P i , P j } is corrupted. The protocol communicates at most 7 log |F| bits and broadcasts at most 3 log |F| + 1 bits.
Proof. Correctness: If the protocol was aborted, either s = rs + s or y = ry + y meaning P i is corrupted, or P j misleadingly accused P i . Otherwise, the players use some (s, y, z, α i,k ) as authentication of s. The probability that (s, y, z, α i,k ) is not 1-consistent is |F| −1 , as for a fixed r there is exactly one way to choose y, z such that the inconsistency is not detected. Privacy: The verification tag z, the values s and y are statistically independent of the value s. Also α i,k is sent only to P j if either P i or P k is malicious. Communication: Seen by counting the number of messages sent or broadcast during the protocol.
Remark 1. If the (honest) players P i and P j do not know the same s the protocol will abort as well.
Assume that P k knows a candidate s for a (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated value s. If P j wants to prove the authenticity of s (i.e. that s = s) the players invoke the protocol Verify. If P k accepts the proof he outputs s , otherwise he outputs ⊥.
Protocol Verify(P i , P j , P k , s , A i,j,k (s)) 0: Let A i,j,k (s) = (y, z, α i,k ). P j takes y as input and P k takes s , z as input. 1: P j sends y to P k 2: P k outputs s if (s , y, z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent otherwise ⊥.
Lemma 12. Assume s is (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated and let P k be an honest player knowing s . If P j is honest and s = s, P k will output s in Verify. Otherwise P k will output ⊥ or s except with error probability of at most 1 |F|−2 . The protocol communicates at most log |F| bits.
Proof. Correctness: Let P k be an honest player,let A i,j,k (s) = (y, z, α i,k ) be consistent with s, i.e. (s, y, z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent and assume that s = s. If P j sends the right y the vector (s , y, z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent and P k will output s. Otherwise P k always outputs ⊥. So assume s = s. Then the probability of finding y such that the vector (s , y , z, α i,k ) is 1-consistent is at most 1 |F|−2 , thus P k outputs ⊥ except with error probability of at most 1 |F|−2 . Privacy/Communication: No information except y is sent.
Unconditional Secret Sharing
Starting from the secret sharing of Section 3.1 we construct a sharing scheme for the Q 2 case using the information-checking scheme of the previous section.
Definition 3. A value s is shared with respect to the sharing specification S = (S 1 , . . . , S h ), if the following holds:
a) There exist shares s 1 , . . . , s h such that s = h q=1 s q b) Each s q is known to every (honest) player in S q c) ∀P i , P j ∈ S q P k ∈ P s q is (P i , P j , P k )-authenticated.
We denote the sharing of a value s by [s]. Let [s] q = (s q , {A i,j,k (s q )}), where s q is the q-th share and {A i,j,k (s q )} the set of all associated authentications. As the perfect sharing from Section 3.1 this sharing is linear and does not leak information to the adversary (for a Z-private S). The following protocol allows a dealer P D to securely share a secret value s.
Protocol Share(P, Z, S, P D , s) P D sends share s q to every player in S q .
4:
∀P i , P j ∈ S q and ∀P k ∈ P invoke Authenticate(P i , P j , P k , s q ). If (for fixed q) any Authenticate(P i , P j , P k , s q ) was aborted P D broadcasts s q , the players in S q replace there share and DefaultAuthenticate(P i , P j , P k , s q ) is invoked ∀P i , P j ∈ S q ∀P k ∈ P. 5: end for 6: The players in P collectively output [s].
Lemma 13. For any adversary structure Z the protocol Share(P, Z, S, P D , s) securely computes a sharing [s ] except with error probability of at most 1 |F| n 3 |S| and if P D is honest s = s. The protocol communicates at most |S| (7n 3 + n) log |F| bits and broadcasts at most |S| ((3n 3 + 1) log |F| + n 3 ) bits.
Proof. Correctness: Assume that P D does not send the same value to the (honest) players in S q (Step 3). In this case at least one invocation of Authenticate will abort (see Remark 1) and P D must broadcast the value. Otherwise all (honest) player use the same value s q in Step 3. We have to show that every (honest) P j gets his authentications A i,j,k (s q ). If all instances of Authenticate do not abort the statement follows from Lemma 11. Otherwise s q is broadcast and the players use DefaultAuthenticate resulting in the proper sharing state (c.f. Lemma 10). Note that a single invocation of Authenticate has an error probability of at most 1 |F| , so the above upper bound on the error probability follows. Privacy: We only have to check that broadcasting s q in Step 4 does not violate privacy. But s q is only broadcast when at least one Authenticate was aborted. In this case either P D or a player in S q is malicious, hence s q is known to the adversary before the broadcast (Lemma 11 and Remark 1). Communication: Follows directly by counting the numbers of messages sent or broadcast (c.f. Lemmas 11 and 10) If a value is publicly known the player can use DefaultShare to obtain a sharing of it.
Protocol DefaultShare(P, Z, S, s) 0: Every player takes s as input. 1: The share s 1 is set to s and all other shares are set to 0. 2: DefaultAuthenticate(P i , P j , P k , s q ) is invoked ∀S q ∀P i , P j ∈ S q ∀P k ∈ P. Protocol ReconstructShare(P, Z, S, [s] q , R) 0: The players in S q take collectively [s] q = (s q , {A i,j,k (s q )}) as input. 1: Every player P j in S q sends s q to every player in R.
2: for all P j ∈ S q , P k ∈ R do 3:
Invoke Verify(P i , P j , P k , s
q is the value received by P k from P j in Step 1. If P k output s (j) q in each invocation he acccepts it as value for s q . 4: end for 5: Each P k outputs some value he accepted in Step 3 (or ⊥ if never accepted a value).
Lemma 15. Assume S q and Z satisfy Q 1 (S q , Z) and let [s] q be a consistent share. Every honest player in R outputs s q in ReconstructShare except with error probability of at most 1 |F|−2 n |S q |. The protocol communicates at most (n 3 + n 2 ) log |F| bits and does not broadcast.
Proof. Correctness: As S q and Z satisfy Q 1 (S q , Z) there exists at least one honest player P j in S q , who sends the right value s q to P k ∈ R in Step 1. Hence every (honest) P k will accept s q in Step 3 from P j , as P j has a valid authentication for s q from every player in S q (c.f. Lemma 12). On the other hand a malicious player does not have a valid authentication for s q = s q from every player in S q (one of them is honest!). So no honest player will accept s q = s q in Step 3 and thus P k output s q in the last step except with error probability of at most ReconstructShare(P, Z, S, [s] q , R) is invoked. 3: end for 4: The players locally sum up the shares to obtain and output s.
Lemma 16. Assume S and Z satisfy Q 1 (S, Z) and let [s] be a sharing of the value s. Every honest player in R outputs s in Reconstruct except with error probability of at most 1 |F|−2 n 2 |S|. The protocol communicates at most |S| (n 3 + n 2 ) log |F| bits and does not broadcast.
Proof. The statement follows directly from Lemma 15, as the players invoke the protocol ReconstructShare for each share.
Multiplication
We present a protocol for the unconditionally-secure computation of the (shared) product of two shared values [a] and [b] . The idea is, as in the perfect case, to use an optimistic multiplication. The protocol BasicMult takes a set M of (identified) malicious players as input and outputs the correct product given that no player in P \ M actively cheated. In a next step a probabilistic check is used to determine whether the product computed in BasicMult is correct. This allows us to detect malicious behaviour. If cheating occured, all involved sharings (from BasicMult) are reconstructed to identify a cheater in P \ M . These reconstructions violate the privacy of the involved factors the protocol is not used directly in the actual circuit computation. Instead we use it to multiply two random values and make use of circuit randomization from [Bea91b] for actual multiplication gates. [c ] is non-zero except for at most one r and the players go to
Step 5 with probability at least (1 − 1 |F| ) (assuming that no errors happen in sharing and reconstruction of values). For at least one player P i ∈ P \ M it must hold that rc i + c i = (p,q)∈I(i) r(a p b q ) + (a p b q ) . By opening all involved sharing it is easy to find these players. Thus it holds that M M and M ⊆ Z * . The overall error probability is composed of the error probability of the sharing scheme and the one of the random challenge check in 
Unconditional MPC Protocol
The combination of Share, Reconstruct and Multiplication directly gives the following unconditionally secure MPC protocol.
Protocol MPC(P, Z, C) 0: The players take S . . = {P \ Z|Z ∈ Z} as sharing specification. Theorem 2. Let C be a circuit over F, where |F | ∈ Ω(2 κ ) and κ is a security parameter, and let Z be an adversary structure satisfying Q 2 (P, Z), then MPC(P, Z, C) Z-securely evaluates C with an error probability of 2 −κ |C| |Z|·Poly(n, κ). It communicates |C| |Z|·Poly(n, κ) bits and broadcasts |C| |Z|·Poly(n, κ) bits within Poly(n, κ)·d rounds, where d denotes the multiplicative depth of C.
Proof. It is easy to see that S . . = {P \ Z|Z ∈ Z} is a sharing specification satisfying Q 1 (S, Z). Hence by the properties of the sharing scheme and Lemma 19 correctness and the bound on the error probability follow. The claimed communication and broadcast complexity follow directly from the used subprotocols. Inspection of the subprotocols also shows that it is possible to evaluate gates on the same multiplicative depth of C in parallel. As each subprotocol only requires Poly(n, κ) rounds, the total number of rounds follows.
Note that broadcast can be (unconditionally secure) simulated using the protocol from [PW96] , which communicates Poly(n, κ) bits in order to broadcast one bit (with error probability of O(2 −κ )). This results in an MPC protocol with the same efficiency and error probability as stated in Theorem 2. The error probability of the presented protocol grows linearly in the size of the adversary structure Z. As |Z| is typically exponential in n, the security parameter κ must be chosen accordingly (such that |Z| ∈ Poly(κ)). This results in a huge security parameter and therefore in inefficient protocols. We therefore provide an extension of the previous protocol in which the error probability only depends on log |Z|, and hence a reasonably large security parameter κ is sufficient.
Unconditional Protocol for Superpolynomial |Z|
The protocol from the previous section has an error probability linear in |Z|, which is problematic for large adversary structures Z. In this section, we present modifications to the protocol that reduce the dependency to log |Z|, which is in Poly(n). The reason for the error probability being dependent on |Z| is twofold: Firstly, the protocol requires Ω(|Z|) probabilistic checks, in each of them a cheating party might remain undetected with probability 2 −κ . Secondly, the protocol requires Ω(|Z|) broadcasts, each of them having a small probability of failure.
Information Checking
In each invocation of Authenticate / Verify, a cheating attempt of a malicious player P i is not detected with probability of O( 1 |F| ) (c.f. Section 4.1). As these protocols are invoked Θ(|Z|) times per sharing, the resulting error probability depends linearly on |Z|. To avoid this we use local dispute control to deal with detected cheaters. More formally, each player P k locally maintains a list L k of players whom he distrusts. At the beginning of the MPC protocol these lists are empty. Protocol Authenticate is modified, such that P j puts P i on his list L j if the check in Step 4 fails. Once P i ∈ L j , P j behaves in all future invocations of the protocol as if the check in Step 4 failed independently whether this is the case or not. Similarly P k puts P i on his list L k if the check in Step 5 fails. As soon as P i ∈ L k , P k behaves in Step 5 as if the corresponding check failed. Furthermore, in protocol Verify, P k puts P j on his list L k if the check in
Step 2 failed. Again P k behaves for all P j ∈ L k as if the check failed independently whether this is the case or not. In both protocols the adversary has a chance of O( 1 |F| ) to cheat successfully, but if he fails (with probability Ω(1 − 1 |F| )) one corrupted player P i is put on the list L k of an honest player P k . From then on P i is never able to cheat in instances of both protocols when P k takes part (in the right position). This means that the adversary actually has at most n 2 attempts to cheat. Hence total error probability of arbitrary many instances of Verify and Authenticate is at most O( 1 |F| n 2 ) and no longer depends on Z.
Note that the parallel invocation of Authenticate, as it is used in Share, requires special care. For example if in one of the parallel invocations of Authenticate (with P i and P k ) the consistency check fails P k must assume that all other parallel checks failed. Analogous modifications are made in Verify and Multiplication.
Lemma 20. The modified Authenticate and Verify protocols have a total error probability of O( 1 |F| n 2 ) independent of the number of invocations.
Broadcast
Although broadcast is only needed in Share, the total number of broadcast calls is in Θ(|Z|). If [PW96] is used, the resulting overall error probability depends linearly on |Z|. To avoid this problem, the number of broadcast calls must be reduced.
To reach this goal we use the fact that the Share protocol only has constantly many rounds. In each round a player P S must broadcast Θ(|Z|) many messages of size O(log |F|). Instead of broadcasting these messages in parallel, P S sends their concatenation to the other players, who then check that they received the same message. If an inconsistency is detected the protocol is repeated. To limit the number of repetitions we use the concept of dispute control from [BH06] which prevents the malicious players from repetitive cheating. Dispute control is realized by a publicly known dispute set Γ ⊆ P × P, a set of unordered pairs of players. If {P i , P j } ∈ Γ it means that there is a dispute between P i and P j and thus at least one of them is corrupted. Note that from P i 's view all player in {P j |{P i , P j } ∈ Γ } are malicious and thus he no longer trust them. At the beginning of the MPC protocol Γ is empty.
Protocol OptimisticBroadcast(P, Z, P S , m) 0: The player P S takes m ∈ {0, 1} w as input. 1: ∀{P i , P S } ∈ Γ P S sends m as m i to P i . 2: ∀{P i , P j } ∈ Γ P i sends m i as m ij to P j . 3: ∀P i if all received values are the same P i is happy, otherwise unhappy. P i broadcasts using [PW96] his happy bit. 4: If all players are happy, each P i outputs the value he holds.
Otherwise, an unhappy player P i (e.g. the one with the smallest index) broadcasts j, j , z, b where m ji differs from m j i at bit-position z and b is the bit of m ji at position z. Then P S , P j , P j broadcast their versions of the bit at position z. Using this information the players localize a dispute between two players of {P i , P S , P j , P j }. Then the protocol is repeated with updated Γ .
Lemma 21. The protocol OptimisticBroadcast(P, Z, P S , m) achieves the broadcast of a message m ∈ {0, 1} w . The protocol communicates at most w · Poly(n, κ) bits and broadcasts at most log w · Poly(n, κ).
Proof. The properties of Γ guarantee that honest players will exchange in Step 2 their received messages from P S . So if all honest player are happy they all will output the same message m . For an honest P S this also ensures that m = m. If a player is unhappy, at least one player misbehaved. The actions taken in Step 4 then ensure that the honest players will find at least one dispute. The protocol will terminate, as the number of repetition is limited by n(n − 1). As the broadcast of z requires log w bits, the communication and broadcast complexities follow.
For a message of length Θ(|Z|) the above protocol only needs to broadcast log |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits, hence the total number of broadcast calls per invocation of Share is reduced to log |Z| · Poly(n, κ).
Lemma 22. The modified Share protocol communicates |C| |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits and broadcasts |C| log |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits.
Summary
The combination of the above extension results in the following Lemma:
Lemma 23. Let C be a circuit over F, where |F| ∈ Ω(2 κ ) and κ is a security parameter, and let Z be an adversary structure satisfying Q 2 (P, Z), then the modified protocol MPC(P, Z, C) Z-securely evaluates C with an error probability of 2 −κ |C|·Poly(n, κ). It communicates |C| |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits and broadcasts |C| log |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits. The number of rounds is Poly(n, κ) · d, where d denotes the multiplicative depth of C.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 2 and Lemmas 20 and 22.
By replacing broadcast with the simulated one from [PW96] , one gets for |Z| ∈ O(2 n ) and |C| ∈ Poly(κ) the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let C be a circuit over F, where |F| ∈ Ω(2 κ ) and κ is a security parameter, and let Z be an adversary structure satisfying Q 2 (P, Z), then MPC(P, Z, C) Z-securely evaluates C with an error probability of 2 −κ · Poly(n, κ). It communicates |Z| · Poly(n, κ) bits.
Lower Bound on the Efficiency
The following theorem states that there exists a family of circuits and Q 2 adversary structures such that the length of unconditionally secure protocols tolerating these adversaries grows exponentially in the number of players. This implies that the computational complexity of our protocol from the previous section is optimal, as there exists no protocol with a computational complexity in o(|Z|).
Theorem 4.
[Hir01] Let C be the circuit which takes inputs from P 1 and P 2 and outputs the product to P 1 . Then there exists a family Z 2 , Z 3 , . . . of Q 2 adversary structures for player sets P 2 , P 3 , . . . (|P n | = n) such that the length of the shortest unconditionally Z n -secure protocol for C grows exponentially in n.
